Introduction and Motivations
The particularly attractive idea to integrate market discipline into the prudential regulation of banks is not entirely new. By complying with a requirement of the American Congress, the FDIC 1 elaborated in April 1983 a study concerning the possibilities of restructuring the deposit insurance scheme. This study 2 (FDIC, 1983) aims at estimating the various reform options likely to strengthen market discipline in banking industry:
"We must seek new ways, in the absence of rigid government controls on competition, to limit destructive competition and excessive risk-taking. There are only two alternatives. We can promulgate countless new regulations governing every aspect of bank behaviour and hire thousands of additional examiners to enforce them. This approach would undercut the benefits sought through deregulation, would favour the unregulated at the expense of the regulated, and would ultimately fail.
The FDIC much prefers the other alternative: seeking ways to impose a greater degree of marketplace discipline on the system to replace outmoded government controls ". FDIC (1983, pp. 3) From then on, market discipline and especially subordinated debt -as one of its privileged sources -have drawn an increasing attention of professionals and researchers.
3 These last years, the idea to let market forces discipline the large and complex banking organizations, and thus to facilitate the prudential mission of authorities, has known a real boost. Recent trends in banking regulations not only in the US, but also at international level, give clear evidence of its importance.
In the US, the financial modernization Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act adopted in November 1999, asks for making a study on the feaseability of a mandatory policy forcing the largest American banks to issue subordinated debt (Subordinated Debt Policy or SDP ). Meanwhile, Top 50 national charter banks insured by the FDIC are obliged to have at least one debt issue, A rated by a specialized agency. The conclusion of this study, made by the board of governors of the Fed and the Treasury Department, was that immediately implementing such a policy in the US is not highly recommended. However, this policy is long-expected and much research on this subject is encouraged. At the international level, 'Market Discipline' is one of the three pillars on which the McDonough reform of the Cooke ratio is founded. 4 This 3 rd Pillar of the New Basel Accord (Basel 2) is exclusively focused on the information disclosure process. In our opinion, the subordinated debt approach is a more extensive alternative to the 3 rd Pillar of Basel 2. An explicit Sub-Debt Policy defines a concrete disciplinary source, as well as realistic transmission channels in the banking industry. First of all, the direct channel becomes effective via the cost of issuing which theoretically is sensitive to a change in bank risk profile. Thus, the appropriate pricing of bank risk in the primary market could ex-ante dissuades banking organizations from adopting chancy activities.
Secondly, the indirect channel could be effective as long as the supervisor and other private counterparts observe the secondary market prices and infer reliable signals concerning the default probabilities of issuing banks. For example, the supervisor could take advantage of this alternative source of information (besides other public and/or private sources) for triggering Prompt Corrective Actions, setting up risk-adjusted deposits insurance premia or better allocating their scarce resources. From this perspective, the market seems an enormous alembic in which information, expectations, beliefs, and fears of investors are 'distilled' and finally reflected in securities prices. However, the price formation alchemy is very complex and somewhat mysterious: besides default and recovery risks, the secondary market prices of bank debt are subjected to the influence of many other non-credit-related factors: liquidity, taxes, systematic (i.e. not diversifiable) risk factors, and specific features of securities.
Unlike in the United States, in Europe the question of the potential efficiency of indirect channel of market discipline remains an unsettled issue. For this channel to be effective, a necessary (albeit non-sufficient) condition is that the secondary market prices be sensitive to bank risk. That is what we call the 'sine qua non' hypothesis. The dataset on which this analysis is based includes spreads, credit ratings and various accounting measures of bank risk for a sample of 71 large European banking organizations during the 1995-2002 period. Our objective is to empirically test the 'sine qua non' hypothesis of indirect channel efficiency in Europe. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one having this ambition in the European context.
Two main reasons motivate our approach. The first one regards a striking fact mentioned in a recent report made by the Research Task Force of Basel Committee (BIS, 2003) . More precisely, the size of bank sub-debt markets and, consequently, the underlying disciplinary potential on the one hand, and the research made on these various markets on the other hand, are extremely asymmetric. For example, if one considers the euro area as a single integrated market, then the European sub-debt market is actually twice 5 more important than the US market. As far as research activity is concerned, the vast majority of empirical studies are based on US data, the European market being practically neglected. As the Committee underlines in its report, "there seems to be considerable scope and need for examining market discipline outside the US " (BIS, 2003, pp. 12) . The second reason pertains to the Evanoff and Wall (2000abc) proposal to integrate the SDP into the US banking regulation. The authors, fervent partisans of the SDP, elaborated a credible gradual plan, to be adopted in several stages as soon as the official approval of the American Congress is obtained. 6 According to their opinion, it would be better to apply this policy at international level, but the lack of a broad coordination at this level would not prevent its application in the United States. 7 While the American authorities paid a lot of attention to this kind of reform proposals (see for instance BGFRS, 1999 , BGFRS&TD, 2000 , the European ones have not yet given any serious answer. The absence of theoretical, and especially empirical studies on European data, could explain in a certain extent this curious silence. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a more detailed picture of market discipline paradigm, focusing on its indirect channel. Besides, it presents an objective overview of the various attempts to empirically test the effectiveness of this channel mainly on US data. Section 3 describes the data sources and the sample construction, while Section 4 presents the research methodology. The main results concerning the spreads sensitivity to credit ratings and various accounting measures of bank risk, as well as the robustness checks, are presented in Section 5. In fine, Section 6 concludes on the strength of the 'sine qua non' hypothesis concerning the indirect channel efficiency in Europe and discusses some policy implications.
The Indirect Channel of Market Discipline
In a broad sense, market discipline is nothing else than a situation in which private counterparts impose constraints that are increasing functions of the risk taken by an industrial firm in general, or by a banking organization in particular. In reality, there are several potential disciplinary sources likely to fulfill this definition, e.g. equity, senior bonds, 'Jumbo' CDs, commercial papers, repos, swaps and other credit derivatives. The recent debates on this concept are focused on the proposals requiring banks to issue a minimum amount of subordinated debt in the form of standardized securities. This section briefly depicts the main transmission channels of debt market discipline and surveys the empirical literature on the indirect channel effectiveness.
Mechanics
In theory, the sub-debt holders are considered the most adapted private market actors for surveying the bank risk profiles. Indeed, under normal solvency conditions, their interests are aligned with those of the regulator and strongly opposed to shareholders' interests. When the bank goes bankrupt, the subordinated creditor claims are seniors only with regard to the shareholders' ones. At the same time, unlike the shareholders, the debtholders can not benefit from more important returns related to excessive risk-taking.
For the subordinated debt market to exercise its disciplinary role, several favorable conditions (see figure 1) , should be fulfilled. First of all, the investors must be capable of correctly evaluating the banking organizations. This is not an easy challenge. According to the modern financial intermediation theory, the bank creates value by setting up some specific screening and monitoring procedures. Following the monitoring process, the bank acquires private information relative to the quality of its loan portfolio, that makes the bank assets a priori more 'opaque' and difficult to assess by outsiders. This peculiarity highlighted by the theory is still an open empirical question. 8 Secondly, the public disclosure of regular and adequate financial information is another essential condition for having an effective evaluation of banking institutions. The Basel Committee confirms the importance of this condition. The requirements and recommendations relative to information disclosure depicted in the 3 rd Pillar of Basel 2 undoubtedly reduce the uncertainty and asymmetric information between banks and their investors. Finally, the incentives of debtholders play a crucial role in the market discipline theory. More precisely, if the creditors know that their interests are protected by an extensive safety net, the monitoring incentives will be irreversibly destroyed. 9 In the same vein, the Basel Committee 8 There are very few studies trying to empirically test whether the investors really have more difficulties in evaluating banks correctly. Furthermore, the results are inconclusive. On the one hand, Flannery et al. (2004) find that the assessment of large banks is comparable to that of industrial firms of similar size. On the other hand, Morgan and Stiroh (2000) and Morgan (2002) conclude that the opaqueness of bank assets continues to veil the banking organizations, especially the largest (TBTF) ones. 9 For example, this ex-post extension of the 'safety net' could be argued by the authorities' aversion to systemic risk.
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Figure 1: Debt market discipline -a 'radiography' recognizes that "the effectiveness of public disclosure on market discipline may be limited if market participants believe they are protected by an official safety net" (BIS, 1998, alin. 27, pp. 8) .
After having sketched the prerequisites to an effective exercise of market discipline, it seems very useful to make an important distinction between its two major 'facets', viz.:
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• monitoring, concerning the assumption that investors (i ) estimate financial conditions and bank risk profiles and (ii ) promptly integrate this information in market prices;
• influencing, corresponding to the effective way the investors actually affect the current behavior of bank managers.
Obviously, the monitoring conditions the efficiency of both direct and indirect channels of market discipline. However, the influencing acts differently according to the type of transmission channel.
Thus, in the primary market, the influencing (via the direct channel) has three main forms: (1 ) the capital funds rationing (quantity effect), when the investors refuse to finance chancy projects whatever is the expected return, (2 ) issuing cost sensitivity to bank risk (price effect), which ex-ante discourages excessive risk-taking, and (3 ) setting of restrictive debt covenants regarding the financing, investment, and dividend policy.
The monitoring activity is materialized in the secondary market of bank debt in reliable Figure 2: Various configurations of the indirect channel of market discipline signals which could be useful to supervisor and other market participants. 11 On the one hand, the market reaction could make the bank financing costs rise or bound the business opportunities of banks (syndicated loans, hedging in OTC markets etc.) On the other hand, the supervisor can exploit this market information available at a very low cost, in several different ways, varying from the softest (informal) configurations to the strongest (formal) ones.
As there is no clear consensus among researchers around the exact meaning of indirect channel of market discipline we offer a broader definition which includes several possible configurations (see figure 2) . The supervisor could use some of the following criteria likely to discriminate among these multiple configurations: the reliability of market data gathering process, the accuracy of market signals, the liquidity, the market development, the experience acquisition for data evaluation.
Among the soft forms of indirect channel we could mention the informal treatment of market information in order to refine the supervisor opinion on sound banks or to justify its doubts about unhealthy ones. To improve the a fortiori scarce resource allocation, the supervisor could conduct its regular on-site examinations primarily on the institutions revealed by the market as being excessively risky. Knowing that the exam frequency is rather rare, the acquired private information becomes relatively fast obsolete (see DeYoung et al., 2001) , and alternative information sources become more precious.
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Besides the on-site examination, bank monitoring device also comprises off-site surveillance models which aim at forecasting either the failure probability (over two years horizon) or the CAMELS ratings 13 at the end of each quarter. The off-site models use as inputs three information sources: (i) quarterly accounting reports that every bank has to provide to the regulator, 14 (ii ) the past CAMELS ratings, and since recently (iii) market information mainly derived from equity prices. The information revealed in real time by the bank debt market could improve the off-site models quality. In this respect, it worth mentioning that it is likely to have unaudited 11 Mitsuhiro Fukao (Japanese Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee ) baptized sub-debt 'canary bonds ', thinking of the canaries used in the past by the mineworkers in searching for coal in order to warn them of harmful noxes of methane gas (see Euromoney, 2000) . Mutatis mutandis, the market -as the canaries -warns supervisor and other market participants of a possible financial distress when spreads reach levels comparable to those of junk bonds. 12 Most insured banks are examined every 12-18 months according to their size and/or financial conditions. The most fragile banks are inspected more frequently. Besides, the large complex banking organizations (LCBOs) have to accept the quasi-continuous presence of the supervisor. 13 CAMELS is the acronym for Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and since 1996
Sensitivity to market risk, the main criteria considered in the assignement of this rating. The rating, on a scale from 1 (the best) to 5 (the worst), assigned to banks following on-site exams, is strictly confidential. For more details concerning the off-site surveillance models, see for example Krainer and Lopez (2003, 2004) . 14 In the United States, besides the quarterly financial Call Reports supplied to the supervisor, the largest banks having total assets above $17 bn. are encouraged to deliver a weekly statement concerning the detailed composition of their balance sheets (so called 'Weekly Report of Assets and Liabilities for Large Banks ').
quarterly reports and to not capture the change in the bank risk profile as long as the accounting information is backward-looking. Furthermore, the forecast theory shows that by combining multiple (a priori 'noisy') signals, which could be not perfectly correlated, the models quality can be considerably improved.
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The strong configurations of the indirect channel formally incorporate market signals into the bank regulation and supervision. The most audacious proposals consist in valuing this information to make the deposit insurance premium sensitive to risk and especially to trigger Prompt Corrective Actions on behalf of the supervisor.
Despite the subsequent reforms of deposit insurance mechanism after the virulent banking crises of the '80s, setting sensitive premiums still is a challenging task. This fact may be highlighted by the American case: at the end of 1999, almost 93% of insured banks (i.e. more than 9,500 institutions) did not pay any insurance premium. 16 This peculiar context which raised some ethics and incentive problems, is in stark contrast to the first 50 years of the FDIC history, when all institutions paid an annual rate of 3.3-8.3 per 100$ of insured deposits. The FDIC has recently studied whether the market information, especially sub-debt spreads, could improve the pricing of deposit insurance.
Using debt market signals for triggering Prompt Corrective Actions by the supervisor undoubtedly represents the most ambitious form of indirect channel. The defenders of this proposal (Calomiris, 1999 , Evanoff and Wall, 2000bc, 2003 , SFRC, 2000 emphasize a qualitatively different effect of market discipline: imposing clear limits to the discretionary behavior of authorities. Regulatory forbearance in the resolution of problem institutions had disastrous consequences during the S&Ls crisis of the '80s in the United States. Hence, strict rules governing the behavior of authorities based either on spreads or on the ability to issue debt securities would improve the resolution of problem banks while reducing social costs. However, such a configuration of the indirect channel supposes the existence of strongly efficient markets, capable of generating very precise early-warning signals relative to the quality of issuing banks. Nowadays, this assumption seems a little bit heroic . . . Besides, quantifying the social costs engendered by errors intrinsic to this particular configuration of indirect channel is rather rough. We bear in mind the type I errors, i.e. not disciplining a 'vicious' bank and furthermore the type II errors, i.e. punishing superfluously a 'virtuous' bank. 
Related literature
This section presents an overview on the main empirical studies analyzing the disciplinary role of bank debt market. Consequently, a whole series of papers concerning other interesting disciplinary sources (equity, large CDs, commercial papers etc.) is unfairly neglected. Also, we do not survey the studies made on the price formation in the primary debt market which rather pertain to the direct channel of market discipline. We consider that the primary market prices do not offer real time information to the supervisor, as far as banks do not frequently issue new debt securities. Moreover, even the most ambitious SDP proposals (Calomiris, 1999, Evanoff and Wall, 2000bc) do not envisage issue frequencies higher than six months.
The studies aiming to prove the presence of market discipline in banking industry try to answer to four fundamental questions:
1. Does the debt market appropriately price bank risk?
2. Does the market promptly identify important changes in issuing banks' financial conditions? 3. Is the market information different from that already available to supervisor? 4. Is the market capable of influencing the current decision of bank managers?
Rational pricing of bank risk . The answers to the first two questions strongly depend on the relation between market prices (yields or spreads) and the fundamentals of issuing bank. The first generation empirical studies, based on a data history of early 1980's (see Gilbert, 1990, and Berger, 1991, for a comprehensive survey) , analyze the correlation between spreads and various measures of bank risk. The results of these studies, mixed at best, generally reveal the absence of adequate pricing in the secondary sub-debt market: spreads poorly reflect bank risk profile (see Beighley, 1977 , Herzig-Marx, 1979 , Avery et al., 1989 , Gorton and Santomero, 1990 ). This disappointing finding seems paradoxical since, during the same period, the yields on large CDsa senior claim with regard to the subordinated debt -were significantly correlated to the bank risk. There are two plausible explanations of this paradox.
The first one, proposed by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , suggests that between 1983 and 1986 the subordinated creditors perceived implicit governmental guarantees which weakened their monitoring incentives. This perception was reinforced by the resolution of Continental Illinois National Bank 18 and the development of TBTF doctrine by the Comptroller of the Currency in September, 1984. Consequently, if conjectural guarantees protect the investments of subordinated creditors, it is very difficult to prove the effectiveness of market discipline. At the end of 1980's, the American Congress promulgated some legislative initiatives (as FDICIA in 1991) whose effect has been the reduction of the perception of this type of guarantees. Indeed, Flannery and Sorescu show that spreads became more sensitive to bank risk between 1989-91, i.e. during the post-TBTF period, while these variables were not correlated between 1983-87. Other studies, made on U.S. data during the post-FDICIA period refine this result (see notably Berger et al., 2000 , DeYoung et al., 2001 , Jagtiani et al., 2002 . Detailed surveys of these studies can be found in Flannery (1998, 2001) , BGFRS (1999), Evanoff and Wall (2000b) , and more recently Flannery and Nikolova (2004) . Covitz et al. (2002) propose an additional explanation of this paradox which pertains to the offer side of the sub-debt market and not to the demand side as in Flannery and Sorescu. Before the adoption of the FDICIA, the decision to issue subordinated debt was not linked to bank risk. As the timing of debt issuance did not take into account the bank risk, the age of securities did not reveal either the financial conditions of issuers. Consequently, the liquidity premium, 19 which increases if the bank does not renew its debt issues, becomes important enough and especially random (with regard to the various risk profiles of issuers) to obtain a non-significant spread-risk 18 In this case, the FDIC did not give up the usual practices intended to protect all depositors (de jure insured or not) via P&A type operations. Furthermore, for the first time the protection was extended even to subordinated creditors of the parent BHC. 19 Bond age is an essential determinant of liquidity premium contained in spreads (see for example Hancock and Kwast, 2001) . Indeed, relatively old securities are exchanged less frequently in the secondary market because they are somewhat 'absorbed' into the investors' portfolios (see BGFRS, 1999, pp. 46). relationship. After controlling for this liquidity effect, 20 the authors prove that the sub-debt prices were sensitive to risk even before the enactment of the FDICIA. In conclusion, estimating the risk premium contained in market prices can be seriously biased if the relation between liquidity premium and debt issue decision is ignored. Finally, it seems that the prices observed in the sub-debt secondary market reflect both the investors' perception of implicit guarantees (via the credit risk premium) and the funding manager decision (via the liquidity premium).
Even if the legal framework has been changed in favor of a more restrictive bailout policy, the beliefs of investors can not be legislated. According to Hanweck and Spellman (2002) , the regulatory forbearance, if anticipated by the debtholders, has a negative influence on the subdebt pricing in the case of (nearly) insolvent banks, rendering the spread an ambiguous earlywarning signal. In the same vein, Penas and Unal (2004) show that the bond market favorably perceives the bank mega-mergers. Consequently, certain banks following TBTF type strategies -i.e. mergers and acquisitions increasing their asset size -take advantage from lower spreads. In Europe this subject is even more complex because of various regulation practices and the presence of large public sector banks. Gropp and Richard (2001) come to the conclusion that the bank debt market does not react to news, like credit rating changes. The weak monitoring performed by the sub-debt holders casts some doubts on the indirect channel efficiency in the European context.
In spite of this disappointing conclusion, Bruni and Paternò (1995) prove a certain sensitivity of yields to the Moody's rating of European bank issuers, financial leverage, and return on assets. However, the scope of their result is very limited: their sample includes only 28 bonds for which the secondary market prices were collected at the end of a single trading day (June 29, 1993) .
Another way of studying the indirect channel efficiency is to analyze in what extent the market prices are able to anticipate the bank default. This approach is adopted by Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) , who show that the yield spreads on bonds issued by five bank holding companies had anticipated six months earlier the actual bankruptcy of one of their subsidiaries. Besides this price effect, a quantity effect is also detected (see Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2000) : as financial conditions had worsened before the bankruptcy, but after the downgrade of Moody's rating, banks switched to insured deposits as a preferred financing source.
A different approach was adopted by Gropp et al. (2003 Gropp et al. ( , 2004 , in order to take into account the peculiarity of European banking sector, where public authorities have always bailed out the problem banks. The idea is to estimate the ability of market prices to anticipate a 'substantial' downgrading (i.e. below C) of the Fitch-IBCA Individual rating which eliminates the safety net effect. Such a downgrade is associated to bank fragility. Their results show that spreads are reliable early-warning signals only shortly before the rating downgrade. On the contrary, the Distance to Default (a risk indicator derived from equity prices) is noisy less than 3 months before the rating change, but conveys useful information 6-18 months in advance.
As far as both equity and bond prices contain some 'noise', a joint use of the information supplied by the two markets could improve the overall quality of the signal. Hanweck (2002) , Gonzáles-Rivera and Nickerson (2003) , Krainer and Lopez (2003, 2004) and Nikolova (2003) show that the combined model performs better than either of the two indicators taken individually.
Besides traditional balance sheet activities, the off-balance sheet operations -which have recently knew a spectacular development -could also influence the risk pricing in debt mar- 20 In the second half of the 1990's, the bond-issuance decision became more sensitive both to risk (Covitz et al., 2000) and private information type (positive/negative) possessed by the bank funding manager immediately before the actual issuance date (Covitz and Harrison, 2004). ket. Hassan et al. (1993 Hassan et al. ( , 1994 establish that securitizations, stand-by letter of credit, credit commitments, swaps etc. contribute to the reduction of the risk perceived by the subordinated creditors. Indeed, the spread and implied asset volatility are negatively correlated to these various off-balance sheet items.
In summary, the main conclusion to be drawn from these empirical studies is that the investors' monitoring is materialized in a prompt and fair valuation of issuing banks.
Mark et vs. Super visor: 'who k no ws wh at and w hen? ' After hav ing i nferred t hat the debt market is able to generate reliable information on bank financial conditions, it would be very useful to asses whether this information could be incorporated into supervisory process. The goal of the studies in this area of research is to compare the nature and availability of market information with those of the information already available to supervisor.
At first sight, one could think that the supervisor, by conducting regular on-site examinations, is capable of acquiring private information. Therefore, the market seems to face an informational disadvantage. Berger et al. (2000) questioned for the first time this hasty assertion. Their study tries to estimate the relative capacity of various actors -supervisor, rating agencies, and equityholders -to produce both timely and accurate information on BHCs' financial conditions. The timelines is assessed by performing Granger causality tests, while the relative accuracy is evaluated by running statistical 'horse races' between different indicators (supervisory ratings, credit ratings, equity abnormal returns). 21 The authors conclude that the supervisor and market valuation in fact complement each other.
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Another way of comparing the quality of monitoring performed by supervisor and financial market is to examine the spreads reaction to the changes of CAMELS ratings. Although these ratings are strictly confidential, a significant correlation between spreads and rating changes would imply that the supervisor has relevant private information, which is finally integrated in market prices. Indeed, DeYoung et al. (2001) find out that the supervisor private information affects spreads with a lag of maximum six months.
If the information generated by the secondary market of bank debt is to be used for triggering Prompt Corrective Actions, it is important to empirically test the predictive power of spreads. Within the current regulatory framework, such actions are initiated as far as the capital adequacy ratios fall below some pre-specified thresholds. Evanoff and Wall (2001) compare for the first time the quality of capital ratios and spreads as early-warning signals of the financial conditions of 100 largest American banking organizations. Their results are rather encouraging in terms of market discipline. The spreads predict supervisory ratings better than (or at least as well as) the capital ratios currently used as triggers for an increased intervention in the management of problem banks. Unfortunately, the forecast errors when one uses spreads as predictors of bank soundness are sometimes important. Refined analyses of these errors are performed by Wall (2002, 2003) , by compounding the spread on the one hand against the Moody's Baa corporate bond index and on the other hand against Treasury securities of the same maturity. 21 The concept of Granger causality helps to quantify the marginal ability of market information to forecast the supervisory ratings, and vice versa. In other words, this methodology can give an adequate answer to the question: "Which class of actors (supervisors, bond market participants, and equity market participants) produces relevant information for the first time?" On the other hand, statistical 'horse races ' allow to emphasize the marginal value of each group's assessment in predicting future changes in three key indicators of bank performance: the fraction of outstanding loans that were non performing, the return on assets, and the equity capital ratio. 22 A plausible explanation of the results obtained by Berger et al. is that the supervisor generally avoids changing the CAMELS rating without performing a formal on-site inspection. So, it is possible that supervisors were already aware of the deterioration of bank financial conditions but decided to postpone any rating change until the next inspection.
In most cases, banks having in the same time a high spread and a good CAMEL rating (i.e. type II errors) are finally proved to be risky according to other warning indicators. The utility of the information contained in market prices can be also judged within the framework of off-site surveillance models. Krainer and Lopez (2003, 2004) show that spreads are useful even when this type of model includes both equity market data and accounting variables. As in Gropp et al. (2004) , the predictive power of spreads is more important for banks relatively close to the default point. Following Hanweck (2002) , Gonzales-Rivera and Nickerson (2003), and Nikolova (2003) , the model jointly using the two main market information sources (equity and bonds) turns out to be more reliable than the simple ones. In an original way, the reliability of the forecast model is considered not in terms of R 2 statistics alone, but in terms of the 'correctly identified rating downgrades/total signaled downgrades' ratio. So, the model including spreads succeeds in improving this ratio even though the R 2 coefficient remains roughly unchanged. As compared with the relatively low cost associated to the integration of market information in off-site supervisory models, the marginal benefit is more important. In summary, the empirical studies surveyed in this paragraph seem to confirm that the information produced by the debt market is different from those of the supervisor.
Searching feedback. The adequate pricing of risk in the secondary market of bank debt is only a necessary condition of the market discipline efficiency. Indeed, nothing guarantees that bank managers integrate the market signals -especially the unfavorable ones -in their current decision making process with the intention to align the bank governance on the investors' interest.
Although the studies on the monitoring efficiency abound, those that try to reveal even a thin trace of feedback on behalf of bank managers are excessively rare. Bliss and Flannery (2002) study whether the securities return (stock and bonds) systematically affect the current managerial behavior (influence) and this behavior has any impact on the securities value (response). Their results are unfortunately not so conclusive. In fact, there is no clear statistical relation between the spreads pattern and managers behavior. Consequently, under the current institutional arrangements the influencing function has to be an exclusive responsibility of public authorities. However, as Evanoff and Wall (2000b) note, this methodology neglects an extremely beneficial type of ex-ante influence, namely preventing bank managers from adopting projects that could harm the investors' interest. More precisely this type of influence ex-ante encourages the managers to avoid in the near future the costs associated to an increased spread in the primary market (direct channel) and/or secondary market (indirect channel).
A more recent attempt to prove the influencing efficiency is that of Kwan (2003) . His idea is to compare the risk profiles of banking organizations having issued publicly traded securities (i.e. a priori exposed to market discipline) with those of banks with no such securities (i.e. not subjected to market discipline). By hypothesis, the presence of a publicly observable market signal will incite publicly traded banks to adopt less risky strategies and to possess more capital than privately held banks. This hypothesis is only partially verified. Moreover, the relevance of final results is rather weak, as far as the largest banks were eliminated from the sample in order to reduce the scale effects.
Knowing that the secondary debt market is generally an over-the-counter market, sometimes very illiquid, it is important to discern whether bond prices really result from effective transactions. The difficulties inherent to data collection process are discussed by Hancock and Kwast (2001) . The authors recommend for the supervisory purposes the use of debt instruments (i ) old of less than three years, (ii ) issued by large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs) and (iii ) whose outstanding amount exceeds US $150 millions. The role of these eligibility criteria is to reduce the importance of so-called technical factors (i.e. not related to credit risk) likely to influence the quality of the secondary market prices.
Recent empirical studies on the indirect channel efficiency confirm that the monitoring activity is effective at least in the US banking system. Indeed, market prices well reflect the conditions of issuing banks and this information is not redundant with regard to that possessed by the supervisor. As for the influencing activity, much more research is doubtlessly desirable.
Data Sources and Sample Construction
To study the efficiency of the price formation in the European secondary bank debt market, we focus on the relation between the credit spread and the various measures of bank risk. Our dataset is built from two main sources: Fitch-IBCA BankScope for the balance sheet data and bank ratings and Datastream Thomson Financial for the market data. This section proposes a brief description of these data sources and the procedure of sample construction.
Accounting data and ratings
BankScope, the main supplier of bank's balance sheet data, provides information relative to 13,000 banks (among than 6,000 are the main European banks) over the last 8 years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . This information includes detailed accounting data (collected from balance sheets and profit and loss accounts), data concerning the propriety structure (branches and shareholding structure), news (supplied by Reuters), as well as credit ratings assigned to banks by the main rating agencies.
To quantify banking performance, we calculated a whole battery of financial ratios divided in two main classes: profitability and risk (in particular credit, insolvency, and liquidity risks).
The rating agencies supply the investors with synthetic measures of the credit quality of main bank issuers. BankScope provides the traditional credit ratings of banks (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch-IBCA), as well as the more recent ratings free of the 'safety net' effects (Moody's Bank Financial Strength and Fitch-IBCA Individual) and those concerning the probability of an external support should this become necessary (Fitch-IBCA Support).
Market data
Datastream offers a very wide coverage of fixed-income securities information: no more than 200,000 domestic and international issues made on 32 different markets.
For every security there are almost 200 associated items, relative to the terms and conditions (amount outstanding, coupon, issue date, denomination, derivative/conversion features, guarantees, sinking funds etc.) and especially the historical series of price and volume.
Datastream also provides data concerning Treasury securities issued by the main governments, which are absolutely necessary to derive the benchmark yield curves and finally the spreads.
Sample construction
To build a data base from several different sources does not constitute an easy task. In particular, each of our two sources has its own identification codes that are quite difficult to match.
We began by identifying from BankScope the most important European banking organizations, the used criterion being the total assets (consolidated figures) at the end of 2002. Then, we searched in Datastream all the issues of fixed-income securities 'alive' at the end of 2002, made by each of these banks (on the whole more than 4,400 issues). Detailed information about issue date, redemption date, amount issued, coupon, amortization features, guarantees, optional features etc. were collected for each of these issues. Following Jagtiani et al. (2002), we selected a "representative" security for each banking organization. To be included in the final sample, the selected issues had to satisfy several criteria as follows: Selecting only 'plain vanilla' (i.e. common) bonds is justified by two different reasons. First, the selected issues are rather homogeneous and consequently more comparable according to credit risk related factors. Secondly, we eliminated the additional 'noise' specific to the binding hypotheses backing the option-adjusted spread calculations. Such models were estimated inter alia by Avery et al. (1988) , Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Nikolova (2003) .
If several issues made by the same bank fulfilled our eligibility criteria, we preferred those (i ) that were made before 1995 (to have a reasonable data history), (ii ) whose amount was the largest one (to reduce the importance of liquidity premium) and (iii) that were subordinated. For the 71 selected issues, 32 being subordinated, we collected the secondary market prices on December 31
st of each year over the 1995-2002 period. Among these issues, only five were made by BHCs, the others being made by banks. Once the issuers were identified, we completed our data base with their credit ratings and other accounting items reported in BankScope. Because not all banks had outstanding debt securities at the end of each year of the analyzed period, we constructed an unbalanced sample including 525 observations (bank-year). The selected bank issuers, classified by country, 23 as well as by the rank occupied inside the national banking system according to total assets at the end of 2002 are presented in Appendix 6. It worth noting that our final sample is comparable in size to those constructed by Flannery and Sorescu (1996, 83 issuers) and Jagtiani et al. (2002, 58 issuers) .
Model Specification and Research Methodology
The approach adopted in this section is somehow investigative, in the sense that our objective is not to test the capacity of certain models to replicate the reality, but to study the 'rationality' of the price formation in the secondary bank debt market. Consequently, the price formation is founded on no explicit (either structural or reduced) theoretical model.
If investors' monitoring is effective, it has to be reflected in prices formed in both the primary and secondary market. The spreads sensitivity to bank risk, as we have already argued, limits the possible configuration of the indirect channel of market discipline. In this context, the 'sine qua non' hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
H 0 : "The investors' monitoring enhances information relative to financial conditions, risk profile and economic perspectives of bank issuers. This relevant information is promptly incorporated into the spreads which become sensitive to bank risk and thus likely to be used for supervisory purposes".
It is necessary to explain why, by validating H 0 , it is not enough to prove the effectiveness of market discipline in the European banking sector. Indeed, nothing guarantees that bank manager decision will respond to investors' expectations. On the contrary, by rejecting this hypothesis, we certify the total failure of the indirect channel of market discipline.
The general framework of our analysis is based on the functional relation between the credit spread and various measures of bank risk: 1995, 2002 ( 1) SP READ it = the difference between the bank bond yield to maturity and the yield of a corresponding currency Treasury security;
X it = market measures of bank risk;
Y it = accounting measures of bank risk;
Although in reality a linear relation seems in a certain extent a 'heresy', we choose this particular specification for the function f (·, ·, ·). This form, also used in some other previous studies, can be view only as an estimate, more or less rigorous, of the SPREAD/ risk relationship:
As far as concern the construction of dependent variable, we applied a method very close to that of actuarial spread which is the common reference among market professionals. To define it, lets consider a corporate bond B and a Treasury security b, whose maturities are N and n, respectively. If t = 0 is the present date, the two bonds can be described by two vectors comprising the future cash flows promised by each indenture:
If one notes P 0 and p 0 the actual prices of the two bonds, the yields (Y 0 and y 0 ) verify the following non-linear equations:
The actuarial spread is the difference SP READ 0 = Y 0 − y 0 when n ≈ N . The construction of this type of spread supposes the preliminary choice of a benchmark Treasury security denominated in the same currency and having a maturity similar to that of the risky bond. When there is no benchmark of the same maturity, most authors (Jagtiani et al. 2002 , Sironi, 2003 inter alia) use linear interpolations. This procedure consists in choosing two risk-free bonds b 1 and b 2 whose maturities (n 1 and n 2 , respectively) surround N , i.e. n 1 < N < n 2 , and the interpolated yield is then derived:
The samples constructed by Avery et al. (1988) , Gorton and Santomero (1990) , and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) exhibit a (quasi-)linear relation between SPREAD and bank assets risk. On the contrary, Jagtiani et al. (2002) show that, in the case of undercapitalized banks, SPREAD increases faster with risk. are the risk-free yields of the two treasury securities. The main drawback of this method is that only two risk-free bonds are taken into account, so neglecting valuable information contained in the term structure interest rate.
In order to avoid this major inconvenient, we use an alternative measure 25 of actuarial spread integrating all the information contained in the risk-free yield curve. Initially, we built the risk-free term structure from a panel of Treasury securities 26 (like OAT and BTAN for France, BUNDS and BOBL for Germany etc.) Estimation details for best fit calculations of benchmark yield curves are presented in Appendix 1. Then, we calculated the yields on each bank debt issue using the market gross prices 27 (including the accrued interest 28 ) collected at the end of every year between 1995 and 2002. The benchmark yield is estimated by substituting the bank debt maturity in the cubic equation which describes the risk-free yield curve of corresponding sovereign issuer. Finally, the difference between the two yields defines our dependent variable SP READ it (expressed in percentage) for every bank issuer at the end of each year of the analyzed period. The traditional vision on the pricing of fixed-income securities claims that the credit spread reflects the default risk (i.e. the default probability with a certain recovery rate) perceived by investors. Nevertheless, the modern theory of risky debt pricing admits that the default risk is not the only component of credit spread. Indeed, the interest rate differential also reflects other 25 More refined measures were used by Delianedis and Geske (2001) and Elton et al. (2001) . Delianides and Geske adjust the spreads by taking into account coupon (duration ) differences, while Elton et al. estimate the spot rates (yields to maturity on zero-coupon bonds) to annihilate the differences in duration and convexity. The advantage of such procedures is that the spreads so obtained are better measured. Since 1998, the decline of outstanding Treasury securities has been gradually inciting the debt market operators to quote a new type of spread, calculated against swap yield curves. The same reason made Evanoff and Wall (2002) use spreads calculated with regard to Baa Moody's corporate bond index. 26 The risk-free yield curves were estimated for seven different sovereign issuers (viz. Germany, United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Switzerland) according to the currency the bank debt issue was denominated. The bank issues denominated in LUFs were associated to the term structure of the French risk-free interest rates because of lack of data. Nevertheless, this choice is not arbitrary. The 10 years risk-free yields on the Luxembourgian securities are most strongly correlated with the French risk-free yields of the same maturity (ρ = 0.95). 27 This is the latest price obtained from the market, and it can be quoted either as a clean price or gross price, depending on local market practices. For some markets, this is the current real-time price; for others, it is last night's closing price. It is always a mid-price. 28 The accrued interest is calculated according to conventions governing each market. Also, the yields calculations depend on the practices specific to each market (for example semi-annually in the US Treasury market and annually in the Eurobonds market). 
SPRE AD (%)
Mean Median premia with no direct connection with the default risk, regrouped in the residual spread : liquidity premium, tax premium, systematic risk premium, optional premium etc. The figure 3 offers an overview on the various components of credit spread. Recent studies on this subject, derived from 'structural' (Delianedis and Geske, 2001) or 'reduced form' models (Elton et al. 2001) reveal that the residual spread represents more than 70% of the observed credit spread. We tried to reduce the liquidity and optional premia, by selecting only the issues without embedded option and whose amount was important enough. Tax premium, estimated at about 20% of the credit spread, is due to the tax differences between Treasury and bank securities. Although tax rates vary in the United States between 0-10% from a federal state to another, in France for example there is no tax premium. This heterogeneity is likely to add some noise to the informational content of SPREAD variable. Finally, as corporate bonds are more risky than Treasury securities, it seems reasonable that the investors require a premium to compensate them for this not diversifiable risk. Elton et al. show that the risk premium required by investors varies over time and this variation affects both corporate bonds and stocks prices, underlying in this way its systematic nature. In the US market for corporate debt, the systematic risk factors usually used to explain the risk premium in stock prices account for 65-85% of the residual spread. Consequently, our dependent variable SPREAD a priori includes both a default and a risk premium.
The data concerning the SPREAD variable are presented in figure 4 and detailed in table 1 (panel A). The level of spreads, relatively low (0.6% on average) at the beginning of the analyzed period (1995) (1996) (1997) , have increased since 1998 (at about 1% on average). The figures 5&6 and the last column of table 1 (panel A) exhibit similar patterns for the SPREAD volatility.
The standard deviation of SPREAD had gradually increased from 0.35% in 1995 to more than 1% in 2002. The interquartile range (Q 3 − Q 1 ), a variability measure less sensitive to extreme values, had a similar evolution over the considered period. The highest spreads, recorded at the end of 1998 (i.e. higher than 7%), are five times as important as maximal values reached in 1995. This peak was caused by the Russian default of August 1998, which seriously impaired the pricing in the bank debt market both in the United States (Hancock and Kwast, 2001) and Europe (Sironi, 2001) .
In summary, the pricing of the selected bonds is relatively homogeneous at the beginning of the analyzed period, but more heterogeneous between 1998-2002. In other words, the highest 
Variability (%)
Maximum Value Maximum Range spreads are associated on average to a higher volatility. This preliminary picture shows that the secondary market pricing became tougher at the end of analyzed period. Such a fact is completely consistent with the increase of investors' sensitivity on the primary market of bank debt and the reduction of conjectural guarantees in the European banking sector in the late 1990's, as pointed out by Sironi (2003) . The distribution of SPREAD by country, depicted in columns 3&4 of table 4, reveals some interesting aspects concerning the potentially asymmetric transmission of market discipline in European banking sector. First, the German, Austrian and French banks take advantage of spreads (0.59%, 0.59%, and 0.75% respectively) lower than the European average (0.87%). This stylized fact could be explained by, among other things, the importance of public banking sector and the presence of TBTF type governmental guarantees in these countries. Secondly, the UK, Spanish, Italian, and Swedish bank bonds exhibit above European average spreads: 1.00%, 1.68%, 1.76%, and 2.09% respectively. Sironi (2003) , for example, confirm that the German/UK banks pay spreads significantly lower/higher on the primary market with regard to their European competitors.
As far as regard the independent variables, these were classified in three main groups: (1 • ) 'market' variables of bank risk X, (2 • ) 'accounting' variables of bank risk Y, and (3
The 'market' measures of bank risk (X it ) are the traditional credit ratings and the 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings assigned exclusively to banks. Because no data on specific bank debt issue ratings was available, we used the issuer ratings attributed by the most active international agencies (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch-IBCA) instead. These ratings represent an appreciation on the capacity of a bank to honor its senior unsecured 29 long term financial commitments (maturities equivalent to one year or more), denominated in local/foreign currency. The availability, estimated at about 70% of total observations, and the concordance of traditional ratings are presented in more detail in table 5, columns 2-7. The three agencies use relatively similar scales and criteria, and assign rather comparable ratings. 30 Indeed, differences higher than one notch are observed only in one of ten cases when two rating agencies rated the same issuer. The ratings are converted in cardinal values according to the scale presented in Appendix 5a. A lower cardinal value corresponds to a higher credit quality. If the rating observed at the end of one year has been changed during that year, we considered that the average rating is a more representative year-end credit quality measure.
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Finally, the SP-M-FI it variable is the average of ratings assigned by the three agencies to the bank i at the end of the year t. The time evolution of this variable, described in table 1 (panel B), is less marked than the evolution of SPREAD, reflecting the vision 'through the cycle' of rating agencies and their lethargic adjustment behavior. The distribution by country (table 4) reveals that the German banks are better rated (2.71 or AA+/AA1) than the European average (3.81 or AA-/AA3). Besides, the decreasing relation between SPREAD and SP-M-FI is consistent with financial theory: a lower quality rating corresponds on average to a relatively higher spread, in spite of the fact that interquartile intervals are not always disjoint (see table 2, panel A). Moreover, according to table 6, the Pearson correlation coefficients between SPREAD and credit ratings are always positive and statistically significant at a 1% level.
Although the traditional credit ratings are synthetic 'market' measures of bank solvency, they do not necessarily reflect the genuine risk profile of issuing banks. In the presence of de jure (for public-sector banks) or de facto (for TBTF banks) governmental guarantees, the capacity of an entity to honor its debt service could be excellent even if its intrinsic financial conditions are poor. The rating agencies have soon recognized this inconvenience 32 and have begun to propose new ratings, focused on the intrinsic safety and soundness of banks, which exclude certain external credit risks and credit support elements that are addressed by traditional ratings. More exactly, 29 Generally, the rating agencies assign less favorable ratings to subordinated issues, the differences being of one/two notch(es) if the issue is investment/speculative grade. See also Sironi (2001) . 30 The Pearson correlation coefficients between these credit ratings are positive and strongly significant (see table   6 ). 31 So, if the end-year rating is the result of successive downward/upward revisions performed during the year, the average rating is higher/lower than the rating collected on December 31 st . 32 Jagtiani et al. (2002) quote the example of Standard and Poor's who notifies in a report of 1996: "For commercial banking, the regulatory framework has been a critical component on S&P assessment of the industry, effectively boosting its creditworthiness. Without this regulatory support, the industry's high leverage alone would rank it lower than the current assessment. [. . . ] In looking at the industry's regulatory framework, several support mechanisms are beneficial to creditworthiness, including: deposit insurance in those systems where it exists; access to central banks as lender of last resort; the examination process; capital and asset restrictions; and regulation of relationships among the bank and is affiliates and holding company ".
these ratings can be considered as an objective evaluation of the likelihood that a bank needs to seek an outside support, either from authorities or its shareholders. Moody's Bank Financial Strengths (MBFS ) and Fitch-IBCA Individual (FII ) ratings, both specific to banks, constitute the only available prototypes. The ratings definitions, as well as the conversion scales in cardinal values are presented in Appendices 3, 4, and 5b. Table 5 (columns  8&9) shows the availability and concordance between these two ratings, while table 6 describes their correlation (less strong) with SPREAD. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two ratings is about 0.76, whereas differences higher than one notch are recorded more often (in 24% of common ratings) than in the case of traditional ratings. The MBFS-FII it variable, representing the average of the two ratings, was computed as in the previous case (i.e. of SP-M-FI it variable).
All banks included in our sample are in the 'investment grade' class (minimum BBB+/Baa1) 33 according to the traditional ratings, but once the influence of the 'safety net' is eliminated (by considering the MBFS-FII ratings), this situation does not hold any more. Tables 1 (panel C) , 2 (panel B), and 3 prove the existence of a certain number of D/E+ rated banks, that have very poor financial conditions. In this context, the criticism of Karacadag (2001) that the PDS would be superfluous in Europe because issuing banks possess very solid credit ratings seems strange at best. According to table 4 (columns 5&6), the most marked differences (i.e. of 2-3 notches) between traditional ratings and 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings appear in the case of German and Austrian banks. The French and Italian banks benefit also from better traditional ratings, the difference being about one notch with regard to MBFS-FII ratings. These simple elements of descriptive statistics suggest that the 'safety net' protecting banking systems in these countries are relatively more generous than those adopted in the UK or Switzerland for example.
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For better explaining the SPREAD variability, we used several accounting measures of bank risk (Y kit ), usually employed in the literature, namely:
ROA -the return on assets is probably the most important single ratio in comparing the efficiency and operational performance of banks. This ratio is calculated by dividing the annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end total assets. Higher ROA generally indicates higher banking performance and so lower default risk. Consequently, a negative sign is expected. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Sorescu (1996, pp. 1358 ), a higher value of this variable might also indicate compensation for excessive risk-taking, in which case a positive sign being expected.
CAR -the Cooke ratio is the total capital adequacy ratio calculated according to Basel Committee standards. It measures Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital which includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and the valuation reserves as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks. From a regulatory point of view, this ratio must be higher than 8%. The ratio cannot be calculated simply, by looking at the balance sheet data, because of the weights which are assigned internally by each bank. However, some banks voluntarily publish this number in their annual report. Being a solvency measure, higher level of this ratio indicates lower default risk. Consequently, the expected sign for this variable is negative.
TLTE
-the financial leverage calculated as the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity.
Higher leverage is associated to higher default risk, ceteris paribus. Thus the expected sign is positive.
NLTA -the ratio of net loans to total assets. This ratio represents a measure of the opaqueness of banking firm's assets and thus should be positively correlated with SPREAD if credit portfolio is perceived as riskier than other assets or it is relatively more difficult to assess (i.e. 'opaque'). LLRGL -the ratio of loan loss reserves to total (gross) loans. This ratio indicates how much of the total credit portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. Given similar charge-off policies, a higher value of this ratio indicates a higher level of expected losses on the loan portfolio. Consequently, the expected sign is positive.
Nevertheless, this ratio can be also interpreted as a buffer intended to absorb future losses, in which case the influence on SPREAD will be negative.
PLNL -the ratio of total problem loans to total (net) loans. This is a measure of the quality of the loan portfolio. The lower this figure is the better the assets quality and so the expected sign for this variable is positive.
OBSATA -the ratio of total off-balance sheet activities to total assets. This ratio should negatively affect SPREAD if investors perceive stand-by letters of credit, credit commitments and derivatives, swaps etc. as risk-reducing activities (see Hassan et al., 1993) .
The accounting variables are observed at the end of each year of 1995-2002 period, for each bank issuer. Nevertheless, the accounting statements are publicly disclosed several weeks after the end of the year. Consequently, following Flannery and Sorescu (1996), we suppose implicitly that accounting information is already incorporated in market prices collected on December 31
st .
This binding hypothesis implies the acceptance of the strong form of market efficiency. In order to test the robustness of SPREAD sensitivity to bank risk, we also computed the SPREAD variable using the market prices observed at the end of January from 1996 through 2003. (vide infra §5.5 Robustness tests) In order to capture nonlinear effects inherent to SPREAD/ risk relationship, three other interactive variables were constructed:
ROALEV
-the product of ROA and TLTE. If profitability is perceived as more valuable in the case of high-leveraged banks, the sign of this variable should be negative.
LLRLEV -the product of LLRGL and TLTE. Similarly, this variable should have a positive influence on SPREAD as far as the LLRGL ratio becomes more worrying for undercapitalized banks.
PLNLEV -the product of PLNL and TLTE. In an analogue manner, this variable should positively affect SPREAD as far as this ratio becomes more disturbing for insolvent banks.
Finally, following previous studies, a whole series of control variable (Z jit ) were used to improve the model quality and to refine our results:
-the natural logarithm of the outstanding amount of the issue, expressed in thousand US$.
This variable attempts to control for liquidity effects on spreads. The higher the amount issued in the primary market, the better the liquidity in the secondary market and so SPREAD will take lower values, ceteris paribus.
Consequently, the expected sign is negative.
MATU
-the remaining maturity, expressed in years. This variable influences in theory the bond valuation process. Indeed, the default probability perceived by investors should be an increasing function of investment horizon. The expected sign is positive.
. . , D 02 -'Year ' dummy variables, quantifying the inter-temporal variations in bond market conditions, the differences in tax systems etc. One of the eight dummies (generally D 95 ) was eliminated to avoid collinearity in the data.
capturing both differences in macroeconomic conditions and differences in 'safety nets' from a country to another.
The D OT HER_COUNT RIES variable was dropped to avoid multicollinearity.
D BK -'Bank ' dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the issuer is a bank and 0 if it is a BHC.
The BHCs can have more diversified sources of income, which should reduce their defaults probabilities and hence result in lower spreads. Consequently, a positive sign is expected. However, the opposite effect is also possible. Descriptive statistics of the main 'accounting' variables are presented in table 3 (aggregated numbers) and 4 (distribution by country). Among the control variables, the issue size is relatively important 37 -amounting on average US$ 260.17 millions, while the average maturity is about 11 years. The vast majority of the issues were international (72%, including eurobonds) and were made by individual banks (93%) and not by BHCs. As Datastream supplies information concerning the subordination status only for the international issues, we could identify no more than 32 subordinated bonds. Finally, in our sample, about 20% of bank issuers belong to the public sector, benefit from explicit governmental guarantees, or are assigned with a Fitch-IBCA Support rating equal to 1. Most issuers for which D EXT SUP variable takes the value of 1 are located in Germany, Austria and France.
Empirical Results
Various specifications of equation (2) were estimated by using standard OLS method, with or without the inclusion of fixed effects. This comparison allows us to infer whether the variation of explanatory factors within a bank (within estimator) and that between bank issuers (between estimator) affect differently the spreads (see also Sironi, 2003, pp. 451) . Table 7 (column 2) reports the results of OLS pooled regressions when banking risk is proxied by the traditional credit ratings. F -statistics, number of observations, as well as (adjusted) R 2 coefficients are presented at the bottom of the same table. The coefficient of the rating variable is strongly significant (at a 1% level) and has a positive sign, as expected: the lower the bond rating, the higher the yield spread required by investors. A one-notch credit downgrade implies 35 Indeed, in most cases the rating agencies assign better ratings to bank debt issues than BHCs' ones (see Jagtiani et al., 2002) . 36 The Fitch-IBCA Support ratings represent Fitch's judgment of a potential outside supporter's (either a sovereign state's or an institutional owner's) propensity to support a bank and of its ability to support it. The following factors are taken into account as determinants of these ratings: (a) state guarantees and commitments, relationship with the state, importance of the bank to the state and (b) guarantees and commitments from one or several institutional owners, percentage control, nature of the owner, importance of the bank to the owning institution(s). The Fitch-IBCA Support ratings are assigned according to a scale going from 1 (indicating an extremely high probability of external support) to 5 (very weak probability of outside intervention). 37 This is due in particular to our sample selection procedure.
The impact of traditional ratings on SPREAD
an increase of the spread by 0.072 % (or 7.2 bps) on average. 38 The ratings and control variables explain about a third of the SPREAD variability. The issue size (ln(AISD)) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, in accordance with financial theory. The amount issued is often associated to indirect measures of the secondary market liquidity. The idea is that the less important issues tend to be more easily absorbed in 'buy and hold' investors' portfolios, thus reducing the market liquidity (see BGFRS, 1999 and BIS, 2003) . Consequently, a relatively important issue size is likely to generate a better liquidity in the secondary market.
Among 'County' dummy variables, only D ESP , D UK and D NET exhibit significant coefficients. So, the bonds issued by the Spanish and English banks are traded on average at spreads higher than those of the other European banks. Besides, the bonds of the Dutch banks are exchanged at lower spreads. A clear interpretation of these results is difficult to provide. However, it is possible that the Spanish/Dutch banks are perceived more/less risky than other banks located somewhere else in Europe. As for the English banks, 39 explaining the positive sign of D UK by invoking only credit quality arguments seems less satisfactory. Sironi (2003) puts forward the difference between business cycle phases in the UK and other continental Europe countries.
As agencies tend to value the issuers 'through the cycle', the assigned ratings do not necessarily reflect the current state of the economic cycle in issuers' countries. A contrario, the market being 'forward looking' prices the bonds according to the economic conditions and perspectives of the issuer. Consequently, the deterioration of business environment in the UK relative to the continental Europe could justify the marginal explanatory power of D UK . The 'Year ' dummies D 98 , . . . , D 02 have positive and significant coefficients, in accordance with the descriptive statistics presented in figure 4. Spreads are on average higher after the market turmoil at the end of 1998, turned on by the Russian default and the subsequent financial collapse of Long Term Capital Management. The liquidity crisis has persisted and has even reverberated in the aftermath of recent financial scandals and events (Enron, September 11 th etc.)
The 'Subordinated ' dummy variable helps us to differentiate the market pricing in function of the priority debt status in case of default. The coefficient of this variable, positive and statistically significant at a 5% level, shows that the subordinated unsecured debt is traded in the secondary market at relatively higher spreads. The difference is about 0.22% (or 22 bps) on average.
Finally, the positive and significant coefficient of 'Bank ' dummy variable, suggests that the debt issued by banks are traded at spreads higher than those relative to BHCs bonds. Consequently, BHCs are perceived by investors as relatively better diversified issuers. However, this result must be interpreted with caution because there are few BHCs in our sample.
In order to test whether the pricing in the secondary bank debt market strengthened in the second half of the analyzed period, we replicate the regressions on the sub-sample 1998-2002. The results, reported in table 7 (column 3), are quite similar. The influence of credit ratings remains statistically significant, the estimated coefficient being even a little bit higher than the previous one (0.082 against 0.072). However, the R 2 statistic is less important.
By including fixed effects into the estimated model we confirm the above results (see table 8 , columns 2&3). The coefficient of the traditional rating is still positive and statistically significant at 1% for either sample. Moreover, the explanatory power of the fixed effects model is even more 38 This elasticity is comparable with that reported by Jagtiani et al. (2002, important (R 2 > 0.70).
Is SPREAD more sensitive to MBFS&FII ratings?
In order to test if the investors correctly price the intrinsic risk profile of each issuer, we propose an alternative specification by replacing the traditional ratings (SP-M-FI ) by the 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings (MBFS-FII ), specific to banks.
The results, presented in table 7 (column 4), reinforce the conclusions of the previous section. The coefficient of the MBFS-FII ratings is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Besides, the model has an improved explanatory power (R 2 = 0, 37). The other variables continue to affect SPREAD as predicted by the theory, with the exception of D SUB whose coefficient is no longer significant, even if its sign remains positive. The coefficient of D GER becomes statistically significant, its negative sign indicating that the German bank bonds exhibit spreads lower than those of European competitors. This result can be explained by the presence of strong governmental guarantees in German banking sector. The estimation over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] (see table 7 , column 7) restates the general conclusion according to which the secondary debt market appropriately prices the genuine risk profile of bank issuers.
Two additional dummy variables (D T BT F and D EXT SUP ) were included into the specification comprising the MBFS-FII ratings, 40 aiming to control for the conjectural (implicit) governmental guarantees and the (explicit) bailout policies. 41 The corresponding results can be found in table 7, columns 5&6 (1995-2002) and 8&9 (1998-2002) . First, the positive and significant coefficient of MBFS-FII rating is even more important than the previous one (0.07 against 0.06). This result shows that the investors integrate the information as to the true financial conditions of banks in their investment decision. Secondly, the negative coefficient of D EXT SUP , which is significant at 5% level, proves that the debt issued by European 'public' banks is traded at spreads relatively low with regard to their intrinsic risk profile. This implicit governmental subsidy, reflected by the decline of spreads, had increased during the considered period from 14 to 22 bps. Furthermore, the D GER coefficient is still negative and significant at 5% level. To highlight the relevance of this finding, we remind the recent conflict between European Commission and German Landesbanken. 42 The apple of discord, namely the public funds provided by local governments (Länder ) at below market rates, was judged illegal by the Commission. In addition, the Germany's powerful Länder (states) hold direct stakes in many of the Landesbanken, which thus benefit from hypothetically unlimited public guarantees. Thanks to this public shield, the Landesbanken are assigned with excellent (top-notch AAA/Aaa) credit ratings, allowing them to raise funds at cheaper rates than privatesector rivals. 43 Sironi (2003, pp. 458 ) finds similar results on the primary bank debt market:
the European public sector banks benefit from subsidies via financing costs savings estimated on average at about 40 bps. 40 We preferred this specification, because unlike that including the traditional ratings, it does not take into account any external support factors. 41 The distinction between the two effects is not very clear as far as the Fitch-IBCA Support rating, used in the construction of D EXT SUP dummy variable, already includes Too Big To Fail effects. 42 The Landesbanken are public credit institutions providing financial services, like central bank type operations for the local savings banks (Sparkassen ), housings schemes and industrial start-ups for state governments, and commercial/investment banking operations for private-sector firms. The Sparkassen also benefit from explicit governmental guarantees being entirely owned by local municipalities. The within estimation strengthens the robustness of our results (see table 8 ). The MBFS-FII coefficient is always positive and significant at 1% level, while the D T BT F and D EXT SUP coefficients are negative and significant particularly over the entire period. The inclusion of fixed effects considerably improves the explanatory power of the model (R 2 = 0.75).
SPREAD reaction to accounting measures of bank risk
The results of OLS estimations (with or without fixed effects) of the model including accounting variables are reported in table 9. Generally, the findings in terms of SPREAD sensitivity are less conclusive than in the previous specifications based on credit ratings.
So, the measure of bank performance (ROA) affect SPREAD very weakly, even when it is interacted with financial leverage (ROALEV ). As for financial leverage, we used successively two different measures. The first one (TLTE ), calculated directly using balance sheet data, poorly explains the SPREAD variability. The second ratio (CAR or Cooke ratio) significantly affects the pricing of bank bonds (columns 4&6) consistent with our intuition. As far as Cooke ratio is considered by the supervisor as a trigger for inflicting penalties to under-capitalized banks, it is possible that investors give more importance to this second variable. The liquidity risk (LIQ), as well as the percentage of loans in total assets (NLTA), seems not relevant explanatory factor. However, when coefficients are significant (columns 8&9), the signs are as expected.
The various variables quantifying the credit risk (LLRGL, NPLGL, and PLNL) exhibit in most cases significant coefficients, but the influences -sensitive to the adopted specificationare not always consistent. Apparently, the loan loss reserve is favorably perceived by investors as a supplementary cushion supposed to absorb future expected losses on the credit portfolio. The signs of NPLGL and PLNL are negative, contradicting at first sight the rational pricing hypothesis. However, when these variables interact with the financial leverage (NPLLEV and PLNLEV ), the influences become positive and significant. This result suggests that for undercapitalized banks, higher non performing loans ratios imply relatively more important spreads, consistent with a rational pricing.
Off-balance sheet operations are perceived by the debtholders as risk-reducing banking activities: the OBSATA coefficient is negative and significant (columns 7&8). This result is consistent with that obtained by Hassan et al. (1993) . Unfortunately, the lack of detailed data in BankScope prevented us from leading a more refined analysis, i.e. distinguishing between the various off-balance sheet items (securitizations, stand-by letters of credit, swap operations etc.)
The control variable previously used, namely ln(AISD), MATU, D BK , and D SUB , have a significant influence, consistent with the economic intuition. The 'Year ' dummies confirm once again that spreads had considerably increased after the crisis of autumn, 1998. By considering the 'Country' dummy variables, one can notice again that German bank bonds 44 are traded at significantly lower spreads. Finally, D T BT F coefficient becomes statistically significant and negative in the fixed effects specifications (columns 11&12), while the D EXT SUP variable negatively affect SPREAD, irrespective of the adopted specification.
In summary, even if the results obtained in this section are not so conclusive, we consider that the 'sine qua non' hypothesis of indirect channel efficiency can be accepted at reasonable confidence levels. Before closing this section, we give two plausible (non-exclusive) explanations which help us to understand better the weakness of the 'accounting' model with regard to that 44 Together, the German public sector banks account for about 39% of domestic retail and corporate deposits and 35% of bank lending. including credit ratings. First of all, the accounting standards are different from one country to another, decreasing in this way the degree of comparability of our proxies of bank risk and performance. Obviously, the credit ratings do not suffer from this handicap. Moreover, when the ratings are added to accounting variables, the coefficients of these last ones become insignificant, while ratings continue to exercise a significant influence (not reported results). Besides, the heterogeneousness of accounting definitions is more severe in the case of non performing loans, loan loss reserves, and charge offs. This major drawback is also underlined by BankScope designers:
" Before analyzing provisions and asset quality ratios it is important to realize that from country to country and indeed within the same country policies vary as to how aggressively or otherwise banks provide for loan losses, when they charge off a loan and they define loans as non performing. These differences can distort ratios. "
The second explanation pertains to the reticence of banks to reveal certain sensitive information as loan loss reserves, provisions in the profit and loss account, non performing loans etc. Indeed, the number of observations decreases sharply (at 190-222) when we take into account the PLNL variable (see columns 11&12), impairing the quality of our regressions.
Time evolution of SPREAD sensitivity
In order to detect certain particular patterns in SPREAD sensitivity to credit ratings and various accounting variables, the analyzed period was split in four different sub-periods: 45 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, and 2001-2002 . The results of estimations for each sub-sample are reported in tables 10&11. To save space, only the significant coefficients at least during one sub-period are presented. First of all, the results in table 10 (panel A) confirm that SPREAD is sensitive to traditional credit ratings. With one exception (1999) (2000) , the SP-M-FI variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Furthermore, this sensitivity seems more important at the beginning (0.093 at 1% level) and at the end (0.087 at 5% level) of the entire period. The control variables ln(AISD) and MATU influence SPREAD according to theoretical predictions. Among 'Country' dummy variables, only D SP A , D UK and D NET present statistically significant coefficients, while the D BK and D SUB coefficients are rarely significant, even if their sign are as expected.
Secondly, the SPREAD sensitivity to 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings exhibits similar patterns. The coefficient of MBFS-FII has the highest significance between 1995-1996 (0.088 at 1% level). All the control variables significantly affect SPREAD in the right direction. Besides, the debt issued by public sector banks and those benefiting from explicit guarantees (either from the State or their shareholders) is traded at spreads substantially lower than those of private sector banks. The coefficient of D EXT SUP has a negative sign whichever is the considered subperiod. However, the marginal influence of this variable turns out stronger between [2001] [2002] . The models including the credit ratings (SP-M-FI and MBFS-FII ) as main independent variables have greater explanatory power at the beginning of analyzed period (1995) (1996) : R 2 > 0.5.
Finally, by regressing SPREAD on the accounting measures of bank risk and performance we obtain mixed results (see table 11 ). So, the return on assets (ROA) has a negative and significant influence only at the beginning of analyzed period, while most other accounting variables (CAR, 45 We also tried to make the estimations for each year between 1995 and 2002, but the results were less conclusive in particular because of the reduced number of observations (40 on average) coupled with the relatively large number of independent variables. LLRGL, LLRLEV, NLTA) have significant coefficients after 1999. The spreads of German bank bonds are significantly below the European average during almost all sub-periods. The same result holds for the bonds issued by the 'public' banks. Indeed, the sign of the D EXT SUP coefficient is negative over all sub-periods, but is significant only at the beginning and the end of the entire period. The influence of D SUB dummy variable has a similar evolution. As in the models including the credit ratings, the explanatory power is more important at the beginning of our period (R 2 > 0.7). The seven accounting measures of bank risk and performance explain a significant part of SPREAD variability only at the beginning (F 7.42 = 2.23, p < 0.1) and the end (F 7.82 = 1.91, p < 0.1; F 7.79 = 3.69, p < 0.01) of the entire period. According to the results obtained in this section, the pricing in the secondary debt market is relatively more sensitive to bank risk profile at the beginning (1995) (1996) and the end (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) of the analyzed period. However, it is difficult to track down turning points in the evolution of SPREAD sensitivity in the European bank debt market. Indeed, no spectacular regulatory change -comparable to the adoption of FDICIA in 1991 in the United States for example -took place in Europe between 1995-2002.
Robustness Tests
This section summarizes the main results of several tests conducted in order to check the robustness of the SPREAD-risk relationship. In particular, we used alternative measures of dependent, control, and independent variables.
One of the difficulties of our study was to compute spreads using a proper benchmark riskfree rate in an integrated market. Consequently, for the issues denominated in euro after 1999, the former risk free rates were replaced with the yields on the Treasury securities issued by AAA rated European sovereigns (in particular Germany, Austria, France and Netherlands). The Pearson correlation coefficient between SPREAD and this alternative measure (SP READ 2 ) is 0.996 between 1999 and 2002, and 0.997 over the entire analyzed period.
By regressing the spreads computed in function of the end-year market prices on variables depicting the end-year financial conditions (but revealed a couple of weeks later), the strong form of market efficiency is implicitly assumed. To relax this binding hypothesis, we also calculated SPREAD according to market prices observed at the end of January when the accounting information is already publicly disclosed (SP READ 3 ). The correlation coefficient between the two measures of SPREAD is 0.971.
Finally, the risk-free interest rates used in the SP READ 5 computations were inferred from benchmark yield curves estimated by a 5 th order polynomial equation (see Appendix 1). The two variables (SPREAD and SP READ 5 ) are also strongly correlated (ρ = 0.998). By combining various available options, two other measures of SPREAD are derived: SP READ 4/6 calculated as SP READ 3/5 , but after 1999, by using the risk-free yield curves of AAA rated European sovereigns. The results of our estimations are not sensitive to these various spread measures. Moreover, these measures are strongly correlated. By substituting the control variable ln(AISD) with bond AGE as a proxy for liquidity premium and changing the definition of TBTF variable (by considering the ratios of T A it / max{T A t }, T A it /T A t or T A it / max{T A country }), our former results are not altered. Apparently, the oldest ('off the run') issues exhibit higher liquidity premium and consequently higher spreads.
To mitigate the drawback related to credit ratings cardinalization (implicitly assuming a linear relation between ratings and bank solvency), we replaced the continuous variables SP-M-FI and MBFS-FII with dummies for each rating class. The best class (AAA/Aaa and A) variable was dropped in order to avoid multicollinearity. The sensitivity of SPREAD to credit ratings is once again confirmed: the hypothesis that all dummies' coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at a reasonable level.
Instead of return on assets (ROA), the bank performance was expressed by three other measures: return on equity (ROE ), net interest margin (NIM ), and net interest income/average assets ratio. Also, the leverage was quantified by the following variables: equity/liabilities (EL), equity/total assets (ETA), capital funds/liabilities (CFL), and capital funds/total assets (CFTA). Instead of the Cooke ratio (CAR), we used the tier one ratio (TOR). As proxy for the liquidity risk, we also employed the liquid assets/customer and short term funds ratio (LACSTF ). The results obtained with these various accounting measures of bank risk and performance are quite similar with those already reported.
Finally, we eliminated from the sample eight extreme observations for which SPREAD was greater than 4%. In this case the results are weaker but not essentially different from those already presented in the previous sections.
In summary, our results in terms of market discipline appear to be robust whichever the variables measurement is.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This article complements the plethora of empirical studies made mainly on US data with a comprehensive analysis of the secondary market prices sensitivity to risk profiles of the largest European issuing banks. More precisely, our objective was to empirically test the 'sine qua non' hypothesis of the indirect channel effectiveness. This hypothesis postulates that investors' monitoring is materialized in the production of relevant information about the financial conditions and perspectives of issuing banks. Therefore, the spreads formed in the secondary market become sensitive to bank risk and profitability and thus they can be integrated into the prudential regulation.
This hypothesis was tested by modeling the interest spread between the market interest rate on option-free bonds issued by banks and the corresponding risk-free rate of the same maturity as a function of various bank risk measures. The final sample includes 71 debt issues (32 being subordinated unsecured) made by the largest European banking organizations, publicly traded, and maturing after year-end 2002. The observation period includes 8 years from 1995 through 2002. Our models are regressed using the OLS estimation method, with or without individual fixed effects.
On the whole, our results suggest that the European secondary debt market appropriately prices bank risk. Indeed, spreads are sensitive to the financial conditions and risk profile of issuers, as reflected in traditional credit ratings (Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch-IBCA) and especially Moody's Bank Financial Strength and Fitch-IBCA Individual ratings, assigned only to financial firms. These last ratings are more accurate risk measures as long as they exclude the effects associated with the 'safety net', symptomatic for the banking industry. However, the relation between spreads and various accounting measures of bank risk and performance is less convincing, in particular because of the heterogeneity of accounting standards applied in European countries.
After all, the 'sine qua non' hypothesis seems to be confirmed in the European banking sector. Our results suggest that market information should be integrated into the actual state of the art of banking regulation and supervision in Europe. As for the exact design of indirect channel, we advocate for the informal (soft) use of market signals, i.e. to refine the perception of supervisor regarding certain banks, to better allocate its scarce resources and especially to improve its offsite models. Indeed, several sources of uncertainty prevent us from proposing more audacious (formal) configurations of indirect channel, like triggering Prompt Corrective Actions. The most important of these sources are the following ones: (i ) the erratic evolution of liquidity premium, and thus of spreads, during periods of stress in the market, (ii ) the market's inability to cope with aggregate shocks and financial instability, and (iii ) the absence of clear empirical quantification of costs associated with type II errors inherent to the indirect channel (i.e. superfluously disciplining 'virtuous' banks).
It worth emphasizing that validating the 'sine qua non' hypothesis can neither serve as foundation to legitimate SDP type proposals nor prove the presence of market discipline in the European banking sector. Indeed, nothing guarantees that banks react to signals sent by the market in order to align their strategies on the investors' interest. On the other hand, by accepting it, at least we can reject the total failure of indirect channel in Europe.
By forcing banks to issue a minimal amount of sub-debt, a mandatory SDP would boost the liquidity of bank bonds in the secondary market and thus improve considerably the quality of spreads as early-warning signals. Besides, such a policy is likely to promote transparency and effective information disclosure and hence improve the informational content of spreads. Recent evolutions in debt market practices in Europe (electronic exchange integrated platform etc.) foster and consolidate the role of SDP as catalyst of market discipline.
Finally, our results concerning 'public' banks (i.e. government-owned or benefiting from explicit guarantees) cast some doubts on the disciplinary role of debt market in this particular case. Indeed, in certain European countries, the public-sector banks -often the inefficient ones -enjoy a hypothetically unlimited governmental guarantee, that may hinder competition not only at national level, but also at international level. Furthermore, for these banks, the indirect channel of market discipline is a priori completely ineffective.
After all, Walter Bagehot was almost certainly right: the bailout of inefficient banks, confronting or not financial distress, even if it is favorably perceived in the short run from a strictly political point of view, turns out in a long-term losing strategy. Indeed, one of the surest modes to weaken modern banking systems is to tolerate abusive bailout policies (id est by disbursing public funds) and thus to obstruct the channels of market discipline transmission mechanism. ***
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Allen, Linda, Jalupa Jagtiani and James T. Moser Panel B : Distribution of SPREAD by 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings SPREAD is the difference between the bond yield to maturity and the yield of a corresponding currency Treasury security obtained by substituting the value for the life of the bond into the cubic equation describing the benchmark yield curve of corresponding sovereign. The 'financial strength'/'individual' ratings are bank specific ratings assigned by Moody's/Fitch-IBCA, cardinalized as shown in Appendix 5b. These ratings, as opposed to traditional ones, focus on banks intrinsic economic and financial conditions and do not take into account any external support from bank's owners, state authorities, or other official institutions. A is the best credit quality class. The B class includes the B+, B, BB-sub-classes, the C class includes the C+, C, C-sub-classes etc. Table 3 : Sample summary statistics SPREAD and SPREAD 5 are defined as the difference (in %) between the bond yield to maturity and the yield of a corresponding currency Treasury security obtained by substituting the bank debt maturity in the polynomial equations (to the 3 rd and 5 th power respectively) which describe the benchmark yield curve of corresponding sovereign. SPREAD 2 and SPREAD 6 are defined similarly, but for the euro denominated issues (after end 1999), we considered the benchmark yield curve of corresponding sovereign issuers AAA rated, localized in Euroland. SPREAD 3 and SPREAD 4 , calculated in an analogue manner, use as input the January 31 bond data between 1996-2003. AISD is the US dollar-equivalent amount outstanding (in millions). TA is the issuing bank's total assets (consolidate figures in billions US$). ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end total assets. TLTE is the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity. ROALEV is the product ROA*TLTE. CAR is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules. NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. LIQ is a deposit run off ratio and looks at what percentage of deposits and borrowings (with the exception of capital instruments) could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. LLPNIR is the ratio of provisions in the profit and loss account to the interest income over the same period. LLRGL is the reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans and indicated how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. LLRLEV is the product LLRGL*TLTE. NPLGL is a measure of the amount of total loans which are doubtful. PLNL is the ratio of total problem loans to the net loans. OBSTA is the ratio of total offbalance sheet activities to the total assets. SP, M and FI are the traditional credit ratings assigned by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch-IBCA respectively, cardinalized as shown in Appendix 5a. SP-M-FI is the mean of these cardinalized credit ratings. MBFS and FII are the 'financial strength' (Moody's) and 'individual' (Fitch-IBCA) ratings, cardinalized as shown in Appendix 5b, which do not take into account the presence of 'safety net' in the banking industry. MBFS-FII is the mean of these ratings. Table 4 : Sample descriptive statistics -distribution by country SPREAD is the difference between the bond yield to maturity and the yield of a corresponding currency Treasury security obtained by substituting the bank debt maturity in the cubic equation which describes the benchmark yield curve of corresponding sovereign. SP-M-FI is the mean of traditional credit ratings (Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch-IBCA) cardinalized as shown in Appendix 5a. MBFS-FII is the mean of 'financial strength' (Moody's) and 'individual' (Fitch-IBCA) bank specific ratings, cardinalized as shown in Appendix 5b. These last ratings do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive any external support. AISD is the US dollar-equivalent amount outstanding (in millions). TA is the issuing bank's total assets (consolidate figures in billions US$). ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end total assets. TLTE is the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity. NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. LLRGL is the reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans, indicating how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. NPLGL is a measure of the amount of total loans which are doubtful. PLNL is the ratio of total problem loans to the net loans. NA = data non available 
MBFS-FII
1.000 (377) *** and ** indicate the fact that the Pearson correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% confidence level, respectively. In parentheses, below each coefficient, the number of common observations is reported. 1995 1998 1995 1995 1995 1998 1998 1998 3 Dependent variable is the SPREAD calculated as difference (expressed in percentage) between actual yields on the bank debt and the constructed yield on a corresponding treasury security with the same maturity. Explanatory variables are defined as follows: SP-M-FI -the average traditional credit rating specific to the issuer assigned by S&P, Moody's and Fitch, converted in cardinal values; MFS-FII -the average 'financial strength'/'individual' rating (cardinalized values); ln(AISD) -the log of the amount of issue expressed in thousand $; D96, D97, …, D02 -year dummies; SUB -subordinated debt issue dummy; BK -bank issuer dummy (takes the value of 1 for bank bonds and 0 for BHC bonds; TBTF -the ratio of the issuing bank's total assets to the total assets of the largest bank in the sample in the year of the observation; EXTSUP -'External support' dummy variable. Equations are estimated by OLS with inclusion of fixed effects (unreported intercept terms). Estimated standard errors are computed using White's method. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Independent 1995 Independent -2002 Independent 1998 Independent -2002 Independent 1995 Independent -2002 Independent 1998 Independent -2002 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001- 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 Dependent variable is the SPREAD calculated as difference (expressed in percentage) between actual yields on the bank debt and the constructed yield on a corresponding treasury security with the same maturity. ln(AISD) -the log of the US dollar-equivalent amount of the issue (in thousand); MATU -the time to maturity (expressed in years) of the issue; ROA -the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end total assets. CAR -the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules. TLTE -the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity. ROALEV -the product ROA*TLTE. LLRGL -the reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans and indicated how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. LLRLEV -the product LLRGL*TLTE. NLTA -the ratio of net loans to total assets. LIQ -a deposit run off ratio and looks at what percentage of deposits and borrowings (with the exception of capital instruments) could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. GER, SPA, FRA, UK, NET, SWI -country dummies equal to 1 if the issuing bank is headquartered in the corresponding country, 0 if not. BK, SUB, TBTF, EXTSUP -'Bank issue', 'Subordinated issue', 'Too Big To Fail', and 'External support' dummy variables. Equations are estimated by standard OLS. Estimated standard errors are computed using White's method. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Independent 1995 -1996 1997 -1998 1999 -2000 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) To fit a polynomial curve to the points, the standard method of least squares curve fitting is used. This minimizes the differences between the observed values of X and Y and the curve. Using this method, the values that determine the shape of the curve (a, b, c, d, e and f ) are found by solving the following linear simultaneous equations:
Where Y i = observation of 'redemption yield' of treasury security in list; X i = observation of 'life' of corresponding treasury security in list; n = number of treasury securities in list. These equations are then solved using matrix reduction techniques to provide values for a, b, c, d, e and f .
The above situation describes the derivation of the equation of a curve in the 5 th power of X. For lowers powers of X, the procedures are very similar. For each market, two types of benchmark yield curve are calculated: to the 3 rd power and to the 5 th power.
Finally, the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R 2 ) is calculated as following:
1.
For each value of Y i observed, P y 2 i is recorded; 2.
Then, each value of X observed is substituted into the curve-fitting polynomial previously derived, to obtain a fitted value for Y , designated by Y f ;
3.
Finally,
. A better fit is achieved as R 2 approaches 1. where
P T t=1 Y it If the null hypothesis is accepted, a perfectly homogeneous panel structure (pooled model) is preferable. On the other hand, if H 0 is rejected, the individual fixed effects model is more appropriate.
Notes:
1. The z statistics could have been also constructed in terms of model's R 2 statistic:
where R 2 LSDV and R 2 pooled indicate the R 2 statistics of fixed effects (Least Squares Dummy Variable) and pooled models, respectively.
2. As our panel is unbalanced, the z statistic must be adjusted. In this case, the total number of observations will not be N ·T , but rather P N i=1 T i , i.e. missing data are not taken into account.
3. If there are p q specific variables included in the 'restricted ' (pooled ) model, but excluded from the 'unrestricted' (within) model, the degrees of freedom must be adjusted accordingly: p r = K + 1 + p q and thus dl = [N − p q − 1, N (T − 1) − K]. This is quite reasonable, since we want to test for unobserved heterogeneity.
Appendix 3: Moody's Bank Financial Strength ratings (BFSR)
Moody's Bank Financial Strength ratings represents "Moody's opinion of a bank intrinsic safety and soundness and, as such, exclude certain external credit risks and credit support elements that are addressed by Moody's Bank Deposit Ratings. Unlike Moody's traditional debt ratings, BFSR do not address the probability of timely payment. Instead, BFSR can be understood as a measure of the likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or official institutions. BFSR do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive such external support, nor do they address risks arising from sovereign actions that may interfere with a bank's ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency obligations. Factors considered in the assignment of BFSR include bank-specific elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset diversification. Although BFSR exclude the external factors specified above, they do take into account other risk factors in the bank operating environment, including the strength and prospective performance of the economy, as well as the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking regulation and supervision." The Moody's Bank Financial Strength ratings definitions employ the alphabetic notation A through E as well as the symbols + and -to indicate gradation. They are as follows:
Rating class Definition
A Banks rated A possess superior intrinsic financial strength. Typically, they will be institutions with highly valuable and defensible business franchise, strong financial fundamentals, and a very predictable and stable operating environment.
B
Banks rated B possess strong intrinsic financial strength. Typically, they will be institutions with valuable and defensible business franchise, good financial fundamentals, and a predictable and stable operating environment.
C
Banks rated C possess adequate intrinsic financial strength. Typically, they will be institutions with more limited but still valuable business franchise. These banks will display either acceptable financial fundamentals within a predictable and stable operating environment, or good financial fundamentals within a less predictable and stable operating environment.
D
Banks rated D display modest intrinsic financial strength, potentially requiring some outside support at times. Such institutions may be limited by one or more of the following factors: a weak business franchise; financial fundamentals that are deficient in one or more respects; or an unpredictable and unstable environment.
E
Banks rated E display very modest intrinsic financial strength, with a higher likelihood of periodic outside support or an eventual need for outside assistance. Such institutions may be limited by one or more of the following factors: a weak and limited business franchise; financial fundamentals that are materially deficient in one or more respects; or a highly unpredictable or unstable operating environment.
Where appropriate, a "+" modifier will be appended to ratings below the "A" category and a "-".modifier will be appended to ratings above the "E" category to distinguish those banks that fall in intermediate categories.
